Principles of Policy Making in a Larger Europe:
What Constitution fits the Union?

This is Europe's unique chance to leave the Cold War behind by following its own concepts in the field of security and defence policy. From the tremendously successful European Integration springs a new self-image that is reflected in its different policies. When regarding security and defence, we stand at the threshold of a new era.
The European Union is in the midst of transformation into a sovereign actor in International Relations, one, of course, with strong transatlantic links. Accomplishing this emancipation in terms of security and defence will be of paramount importance for the future stability of our continent, since we will be experiencing a widening variety of different forms of conflict in the 21st century.

It is important at this point to argue for including CFSP and ESDP into the first pillar of Community Law. The intergovernmental approach has not led to satisfactory results. On the contrary, it has impeded swift and efficient answers to immediate threats on the international arena. To change this is one of the original tasks of the new Convention on the Future of Europe.

I have long been convinced that amending the treaties should not be solely a government issue. The democratically elected representatives on the national and the European levels must be involved appropriately, so that those difficult questions can be discussed constructively and transparently and not halfheartedly in intergovernmental conference marathons.

The government representatives are clearly a minority in the new Convention on the Future of Europe, while the large majority consists of members of the different Parliaments. Now we have to make sure that this majority is reflected in the Convention's conclusions.

Negotiations in the Convention have been underway since March 2002 and shall lead to a true European Constitution. Starting point are the existing treaties, since the job is to improve an already well-functioning entity and ensure this functionality after enlargement by rendering it more efficient and comprehensible. The actor of any future political decision has to be clearly identifiable. This is the only way how Europe as a whole may escape to be used as a scapegoat.

A transparent constitution may well serve as a powerful integrative symbol. All of a sudden, the people could get a grip of their Europe. This symbol, however, has to be equipped with special tools, so as to be internationally recognised. Unfortunate enough, that not all of our world is a haven of freedom, security and justice.

The increase in crises where the nation-state is no longer the main protagonist invokes a new definition of crisis causes and crisis response. More and more crises root in utilitarian objectives and national interests and, sadly, in ideological, ethnic and religious causes. Hostilities in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Macedonia have dramatically showcased the European Union's military impotence as well as the need for strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy. Even though no member-state is in immediate danger of armed aggression by third countries, the remaining or new potentially destabilising geostrategic factors are numerous. The world is still a dangerous place indeed.

It seems that international cross-border terrorism is becoming the main threat to the 21st century. The shocking events of September 11 showed that there can be no absolute safety. The regular means of defence are powerless and unable to react to the evil challenge of terrorism. To counter that threat we need to quickly find solutions and press for the support of the international community. Foreign and domestic security are two faces of the same coin.
Everything has to be done to uproot terrorism and to contain and overcome the hatred between religious and ethnic groups. In the near future the European Union will bear more responsibility with the strengthening of its ESDP and will accept a bigger contribution to regional crisis management. Clearly, one cannot face this situation with military might alone but rather the whole spectrum of non-military instruments for the prevention and fight against terror has to be used, especially the cross-border mechanisms of security policy - such as supranational cooperation in law enforcement and justice, support for the reconstruction of civil society and democratic institutions.
There is an obvious multilateral dividend to this.

Although the national defence budgets of the EU member-states add to about 60% of that of the US, the EU countries dispose of less than 20% of the American operative capabilities.
At present, European capabilities are sufficient only for operations like catastrophe relief or evacuation measures. Other duties under the Petersberg Assignments will remain out of reach without lasting political will for more military capabilities. At this point, even the most detailed of questions considered in the Council of Foreign Ministers that is often forced to deal with all kinds of specific problems of current affairs. ESDP, therefore, needs a board of specialists with real decision-making powers. Technical and operative questions do require the establishment of a Council of Defence Ministers.

ESDP aims at an independent EU crisis prevention and crisis response mechanism. This, however, will not come without effective civil and military instruments for planning, implementing and coordinating the operations. A credible and potent ESDP will dispose of a whole series of mechanisms to protect its values and interests. Nevertheless, any resolution concerning possible interventions in the framework of Petersberg is to be democratically legitimised by the European and national Parliaments. The European Union will amplify its present security structure in concert with its allies and will strive to meet the US demands for a fair burden sharing.

Unfortunately, we experience daily inter-institutional tensions and conflicts of competence between the Presidency, the High Representative and the Commissioner for external relations. Under my lead the European Parliament adopted a report on the progress made in the execution of a Common Foreign Security Policy in November 2000 that suggested abandoning the pillar structure and extending the community method to matters of CFSP. The CFSP and all other activities with an external dimension are grouped in the first pillar but should be combined under the expression "external relations".
That would mean that the portfolios of the High Representative for the CFSP and that of the Commissioner for external relations should be combined in the person of a Vice President of the Commission with special links to the Council. Parallel structures have to be prevented so that the organisations do not work against each other and the envisaged synergies can be reaped.

The Council of Ministers needs reforming, too. The cry for far-reaching democracy and transparency will only be heard if the Council is split into a legislative and an executive chamber. The legislative council could deliberate in public and function as an upper chamber just like the German Bundesrat, while the executive council should closely cooperate with the European Commission in order to guarantee coherent policies. Apart from a strengthened executive council of foreign ministers we should also consider the establishment of a council of defence ministers that is specifically concerned with questions of the ESDP. This would institutionalise the informal meetings of defence ministers of our days and complete the overall superstructure.

The close relationship between EU and NATO has to be clearly defined. Close political cooperation including regular consultation on minister and ambassadorial levels will be paramount. We already accomplished a set of permanent agreements under the Swedish presidency. Furthermore, a first informal meeting between the EU foreign ministers and NATO took place in Budapest. Meetings have also been held on the level of the EU's political and security committees and the North Atlantic Council of NATO as well as between the military committees.
In order to prevent duplicating existing structures, it is important that the Rapid Reaction Force may recur on the planning capacities and command structures of NATO. To harmonise the armed forces policies of NATO and EU we urgently require a strategic partnership that allows for the shared use of existing capacities.

NATO-Enlargement into Eastern Europe strengthens the freedom and security of all of us. We also need an appropriate consultation mechanism for Russia. But NATO is too valuable for Europe to let it become a mere political talking shop - with Russia and the US steering NATO without the European allies. The danger of marginalization looms. We can prevent that from happening by building military capabilities fast. NATO's European pillar will remain a valuable and vital part of the most successful Alliance ever.

ESDP, therefore, can be understood as being an open process. This openness refers to three areas: Firstly, the discussion about the European security has to be ignited on all levels. Secondly, as sensitive as military and operative details may be, they must not be automatically labelled secret. The citizenry has a right to transparent and comprehensive information on the use of his tax money. Thirdly, this process has to be able to adapt to any new challenges in the world.

Let me assure you again, that Europe's collective security will remain to be NATO's concern. But in the light of the facts, it becomes obvious that a strategic overall concept has to be devised in order to define the relations between CFSP and ESDP on the one hand and between civil and military crisis management on the other. This will pave the way for lasting security and peace.

Europe's constitution needs a foreign and security component of its own. Europe's constitution must reach out to the world.

Thank you.